WORKING PAPER

APRIL 2012

RECONCILIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR

LESSONS FOR FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

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Abstract

This paper critically examines the United Nations (UN) peace and statebuilding operations in East Timor from 1999 to 2006, with a focus on the UN's approach to conflict management. Its central argument is that the lack of a comprehensive conflict analysis hampered the UN's efforts, and represented a surprising omission, given East Timor's conflict history. Moreover, no overall plan or strategy to guide peace or statebuilding activities was created by the UN, and few explicit efforts were made for longer-term reconciliation or conflict resolution. Reconciliation was only included in the UN operations mandate after the major crisis (and resumption of conflict) in 2006. Although a number of useful conflict resolution and reconciliation activities were eventually carried out in East Timor, certain conflict aspects crucial to the 2006 crisis were not addressed. In particular, large-scale reconciliation efforts recommended by the Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in 2005 were not implemented.

To assess whether the experiences from East Timor are relevant today, this article makes a comparison with more recent peace-building operations in Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR). Both countries also have a history of violent and complex conflict, and both were supported by the new UN peacebuilding architecture of 2006, consisting of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund. This article examines whether this architecture has helped to ensure adequate mandates, relevant plans for conflict management, proper conflict analysis and adequate peacebuilding activities. It concludes that even after the introduction of new peacebuilding architecture, the strategic plans for peacebuilding in both Burundi and the CAR continued to suffer from the lack of a comprehensive conflict analysis and from a strong commitment to reconciliation and conflict resolution.

The paper concludes by suggesting that UN peacebuilding operations and/or the Peacebuilding Commission should routinely provide a comprehensive conflict analysis as a basis for peacebuilding planning, that reconciliation should consistently be included in peacebuilding mandates, and the UN should consider taking a more active role in pursuing longer-term conflict resolution.
Introduction

In August 1999, after nearly 25 years of occupation, East Timor decided to break loose from Indonesia in a referendum facilitated by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). The Indonesian-friendly militia responded with massive violence and destruction, supported by the Indonesian army, which forced some 250,000 people to flee their homes. After a negotiated withdrawal of the Indonesian army and deployment of international peacekeeping forces, the international community made a comprehensive effort to build peace in the country. The UN and the World Bank, supported by some 50 international donors, contributed US$ 4 billion to the process. East Timor gained independence in 2002, and the new country seemed relatively peaceful. The international community began to reduce its support, and the UN reduced its presence. However, in March-April 2006, internal violence broke out, frustrating the nation-building process.

The 2006 crisis started when a large number of Timorese soldiers, mainly from the west of the country, went on strike, claiming that they were being discriminated against. In the stand-off that followed, 591 soldiers (some 42% of the army) were dismissed. The violence that followed included extensive violence between people from the east and west. It caused at least 32 deaths and led to approximately 150,000 people being driven from their homes. Some politicians encouraged the violence, trying to utilise the situation for their own interests. A breakdown of the government followed, and international forces were again deployed.

The UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, analyzing the 2006 crisis, observed that “(The situation) can only be fully understood in the historical and cultural context of the country”¹. Accepting that as a starting point, this article offers a brief history of conflict in East Timor, which reveals factors and aspects of diverse nature and origin. Not all were directly relevant to the crisis in 2006, but they do demonstrate a clear and general need for conflict analysis.

Starting with the situation which faced the UN in 1999, this paper sets out four main elements of any peacebuilding operation and assesses the degree to which these effectively addressed the challenge in East Timor: 1) the initial mandate (which frames the nature of priorities of the mission); 2) the overall strategic plan for peacebuilding; 3) the underlying analysis of the conflict; and 4) the specific set of conflict management/peacebuilding activities. In particular, it examines the extent to which reconciliation and conflict resolution were included in the original mandate, the depth and breadth of the conflict analysis, and the effectiveness of those activities which were pursued. In the process, it highlights gaps in analysis that may have been crucial and suggests additional activities might have been undertaken.

While the findings from East Timor suggest serious gaps in the UN’s approach, it is important to establish whether these experiences are still relevant. 2006, the year the young Timorese

state ‘collapsed’, also saw the establishment of a new UN peacebuilding architecture, consisting of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The purpose of the PBC was to provide strategic peacebuilding support, strengthen funding advocacy, coordination, and establish ‘best practices’. The PBSO’s task was to support the work of the PBC and oversee the operation of the PBF, which was established to support peacebuilding activities in their early critical stages.²

Given this new architecture and experience gained since 1999, is the UN better today at analyzing conflicts, planning and implementing reconciliation and pursuing conflict resolution? Do today’s UN mandates include reconciliation? The 2004 High-level Panel of the Secretary General, which developed the proposal for the PBC, envisioned UN staff with the capacity to design national reconciliation mechanisms³. Has this vision materialized, leading to effective reconciliation efforts?

Among the countries supported by the new peacebuilding architecture were Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition to a troublesome colonial past, both countries have, since gaining independence,⁴ been marred by decades of internal conflicts compounded by coups and criminal activities, resulting in extreme violence and extensive displacement of victims. The conflict equations in CAR and Burundi involve a variety of armed factions, threats of militia from neighbouring countries and serious ethnic and political animosities. In terms of complex conflict landscapes, these two countries are comparable to East Timor and therefore selected for comparison.⁵

The analysis which follows is based on UN documents and independent reports and analyses, correspondence with UN staff and NGO representatives, interviews and phone conversations with UN staff, politicians and civil servants in East Timor, and representatives of civil society organizations.

1. Peacebuilding in East Timor

A History of Conflict

Conflicts appear to have arrived with early human settlements in East Timor. Social anthropologist Paulo Castro Seixas, describing pre-colonial conflicts, suggests that as different ethnic groups arrived from various parts of South-East Asia to settle in East Timor, the stronger tribes pushed the weaker ones away from the attractive fertile coastline towards the mountainous, less fertile inland.⁶ The Portuguese arriving in East Timor in 1513, initially as

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⁴ CAR gained independence in 1960 and Burundi in 1962.
⁵ It should be noted that while the UN monitoring in East Timor is addressed as in part an analysis of poor conflict management, this aspect is not relevant in Burundi and CAR, where the respective governments were responsible for the peacebuilding process from the start.
traders, did not find a united people, and as they later started a colonization process they were able to handle resistance by exploiting local differences.\(^7\)

At some stage, the territory of East Timor was effectively split in two, with the area of Manatuto/Dili serving as a dividing line and space for cultural brokerage.\(^8\) This divide appeared as an early version of a conflict aspect that emerged as critical during the crisis in 2006. One example of the divide and rule approach was the crackdown of a rebellion in 1855, when the Portuguese mounted an army of 12,000 men, mainly Timorese, and massacres on both sides occurred. Another was an operation in 1912, which left some 3,424 rebels dead and 12,567 wounded.\(^9\) The Second World War, which caused some 40,000 deaths in East Timor, brought another element of divide. While Portugal declared itself neutral early on, many Timorese fought with Australian forces, and a few liurais (petty kingdoms) sided with the Japanese.

The Carnation revolution in Portugal in 1974 brought hopes of freedom for East Timor. A coup was launched in 1975 by the first political party, the right-wing Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), and a counter coup was staged by the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), its left-wing rival. While the Portuguese left the island, a Timorese ‘civil war’ lasting from May to September that year took up to 3,000 lives and forced some 200,000 from their homes. Shortly after, Indonesia, which had its own design for East Timor, occupied some of its western towns. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN, the new name for ASDT) declared independence in November 1975, following which the four other Timorese political parties, which had fled to Indonesia, signed the Balibo Declaration proclaiming integration with Indonesia. On 7 December 1975, Indonesia - with the tacit approval of the communist-wary US and Australian governments - launched full occupation of East Timor. This was the start of struggle for liberation that would last for 24 years.

As in the Portuguese era, many Timorese sided with the occupying power, despite comprehensive Indonesian atrocities. Others were forcibly recruited to search for and fight the FALINTIL, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor. The Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) found that between June and September 1981, the Indonesian army recruited some 60,000 people for this purpose.\(^10\)

Atrocities took place on both sides. Including the events in 1975 and 1999, 29% of all unlawful killings and disappearances reported to the CAVR were committed by forces affiliated with the resistance movement, and the CAVR held FRETILIN/FALINTIL responsible for creating an atmosphere of violence.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) Seixas, Vioogers, 210-212.


\(^11\) Ibid. 59 and 61.
There were also violent conflicts within the resistance movement. In 1977, an internal FRETILIN conflict saw several hundred followers and suspected followers of the then FRETILIN President Francisco do Amaral killed outright or after torture and/or ill treatment during detention. Due to a lack of knowledge and contacts among the various groups, there were also betrayals by some captured by the Indonesians.

The conflicts at play in the ‘civil war’ and the following occupation years were multi-faceted. The CAVR found that ‘deep-seated communal differences, often based on personalities and economic interests, heavily influenced the shape of politics in the months leading up to the internal armed conflict’. The Catholic Church, according to CAVR, did not play a mediating role or promote dialogue in 1974–76. Instead it ‘took sides and fanned the flames of the conflict’ (later on, we find the church advocating unity within the resistance movement). Although there were few manifestations of ethnic or religious conflicts during the occupation years, the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council of 26 July 2000, observes: ‘Ethnic and religious minorities have also been the targets of harassment and intimidation. On 8 June, the Protestant churches in Ermera and Aileu were burned. There were also several attacks on the mosque in Dili, and ethnic Chinese were threatened and harassed.’

Also worth noting is the observation made by the Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD), a Timorese NGO which carried out country-wide hearings in a joint project with Switzerland’s Interpeace on obstacles to peace in 2008/2009: ‘In Viqueque, communal violence and intimidation based on ethnic differences between the nauwiti and the makasae occur every year. Then they spread to other groups, creating instability throughout the district’.

Conflicts between martial arts groups were part of the equation. Clashes between the groups became gang wars, causing loss of life, burnt houses, and spread violence to society as a whole. Some of the groups were involved in criminal gang activities. There were also a number of gangs with no martial arts affiliation. The biggest were believed to have several thousand members, largely unemployed youth that were vulnerable to political manipulation, but the martial arts groups also included senior citizens, even politicians. One study conducted in 2005 suggested that up to 70% of East Timorese men were members of a...
martial arts group, but notably this estimate was made after years of increased membership. In early 1995, ‘Ninja gangs’ responding to the Santa Cruz massacre (see below), roamed the streets of Dili at night, burning houses and attacking residents. An Indonesian-friendly group named Garda Paksi later emerged, fighting back and terrorizing the population.

The political conflicts took on a new dimension in 1987. The leader Xanana Gusmao resigned from FRETILIN, setting up the National Council of Maubere, which aimed to be an all-inclusive organization, and was later replaced by the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). This change brought FALINTIL, the armed branch of FRETILIN, under CNRT’s control, causing FRETILIN to lose control of the policies of the resistance. This caused tensions that, according to the UN Independent Special Inquiry for Timor-Leste, ‘still reverberate within Timor-Leste today’.

In 1991, international attention was drawn to East Timor when footage of the massacre of some 270 demonstrators by the Indonesian army in Santa Cruz, Dili, was filmed by a foreign journalist and broadcast worldwide. After the death of President Suharto in 1998, a UN initiative had eventually led to an agreement with Indonesia, co-signed by Portugal, to hold a referendum in East Timor, offering its people the choice between independence and autonomy within Indonesia. The responsibility for this operation was assigned to the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET, 11 June to 30 September 1999). As the result of the referendum revealed that 78.5 % had voted in favour of independence, the Timorese militia (recruited, trained and supported by the Indonesian army), embarked on violent attacks, killing more than 1,400 people, assaulting thousands and raping hundreds of women. Some 60,000 houses were burnt, approximately 250,000 people were forced into deportation, and around 300,000 displaced. Yielding to diplomatic pressure, Indonesia soon accepted the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. The first troops in Operation Stabilize, conducted by the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), arrived on 20 September, and on 25 October 1999, the UN Security Council issued its mandate for a UN transitional mission to East Timor (UNTAET).

In conclusion, East Timor’s history is marred by numerous conflicts. Early ethnic divisions were followed by nearly 400 years of conflict related to Portuguese oppression, throughout which parts of the population always sided with the foreign power, a story that repeated itself during World War II. Together, the ‘civil war’ of 1975 and the 24 years of Indonesian occupation (including the events of 1975 and 1999) caused around 100,000 deaths, along with associated atrocities and destruction, rendering East Timor a traumatized society. Deep divisions and a lack of national cohesion are obvious results, along with personal conflicts and mistrust. Peace and liberty advocate Bishop Belo once described East Timor as a society where half of the population was paid to spy on the other half. The chaos following the 1999 referendum was a stark demonstration of the divisions within the population. This was

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24 Geoffrey Robinson, "If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die": How Genocide was Stopped in East Timor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 75.
26 CAVR, Chega!, 44.
compounded by a culture of martial art groups and gangs, a low threshold for political violence, the tension within the resistance movement, and the indications of entrenched ethnic conflicts. The need for a profound analysis was therefore compelling, not only in hindsight.

One might also have hoped that the huge challenge of building a new nation from scratch, and to plan this within only two years, would instil the humility needed to realize that thorough background knowledge of the society in question was required. However, a common view among the international actors engaged in the country seems to have been that the Timorese had largely united during the freedom struggle, and that the part of the population that had voted against independence had fled the country. The UN therefore focused more on the relationship with Indonesia and ensuring that the Timorese militia remained on the Indonesian side of the border.

While this focus was clearly justified, the limited interest in internal conflicts is surprising. From the beginning, the UN worked hard in conjunction with the Government to bring the exiled population back to East Timor, an effort that was largely successful. This meant a large part of the population would still be dissidents, resulting in a continued divide over an aspect that had meant life or death to the Timorese for several hundred years.

Another aspect that had not yet materialized as an explicit conflict in 1999 was the relationship between people from the east and west of East Timor. This potential threat was hardly visible to outsiders, but important in terms of future conflict analysis.

**The UN Mandates**

While the mandate of the earlier UNAMET mission was limited to preparing and holding a referendum on independence versus autonomy, the mandate of UNTAET, operating from October 25, 1999 to May 20, 2002, was:

- To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
- To establish an effective administration;
- To assist in the development of civil and social services;
- To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;
- To support capacity-building for self-government;
- To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

The following UN operation, UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET, 5 February to 20 May 2005), which commenced as East Timor gained independence, consisted of a reduced number of UN staff and military personnel with a mandate focusing on assistance to core administrative structure and the provision of law enforcement and security. The subsequent operation, UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL, 20 May, 2005 to 20 May 2006), had an even further reduction in civilian staff, and its military personnel were only tasked with the security of the operation itself. Its mandate was to support critical state institutions,

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including the Timorese police and Border Patrol, to provide human rights training and monitor progress.26

Reconciliation and political dialogue were not mentioned in the mandate of any of the first three UN operations. This changed only after the 2006 crisis, when the Security Council resolution of August 25, 2006 gave the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) a mandate with the following opening term:

‘(a) To support the Government in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion’.

Given the wording of the different mandates, to what extent did the UN include reconciliation and conflict resolution in its planning and activities before the 2006 crisis?

Planning for Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution

‘There is a ‘knowledge deficit’ that is one of the repeating dilemmas of United Nations work in post-conflict countries – the most important decisions are the ones taken at the very beginning, when everything is fluid, but at the very time when we know least about the people and the place with which we are dealing.’ (Lakhdar Brahimi – Hiroshima, March 2005)28

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was given the task of preparing for the UNTAET mission and had three weeks in October 1999 to prepare the Secretary General’s report that would outline the mandate and organization of the mission.29 The late start is surprising, as it had been known since early May that year that the UN would have a role in the administration of East Timor.30 The fact that DPKO was given the job instead of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) implies that East Timor was considered a peace-keeping and not peace-building case, a choice that was clearly inadequate in light of the situation and history of Timorese society. As is shown below, however, it was the Secretary General’s intention that UNTAET should conduct some reconciliation efforts, and UNTAET did take on a number of such tasks, thus indeed conducting peace-building. Even if the need for a thorough conflict analysis had been observed, there was not enough time for it in October 1999, and the preparation process for the UN Transitional Administration UNTAET was to a large extent based on the model applied in Bosnia and Kosovo. An evaluation report in March 2003 observed that DPKO interpreted its task narrowly, excluding from the planning process the Department of Political Affairs, the World Bank, and the natural Timorese counterpart, CNRT. DPKO’s own planning resources were also inadequate for these demands, as it had been tasked to plan or expand four other operations at that time.31

According to the Secretary General’s report to the Security Council of 4 October 1999 outlining the mandate of UNTAET, the operation would include a number of objectives

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31 Kings College, Review of Peace Operations, 16 (footnote 15).
(‘activities’), among which the following were particularly relevant to reconciliation and conflict resolution:

- To develop mechanisms for dialogue at the national and local levels
- To undertake confidence-building measures and provide support to indigenous processes of reconciliation
- To create conditions of stability through the maintenance of peace and security, (including through programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration)

Whereas objectives related to governance, judiciary and police were supported by outlined activities, there were no specific activities defined for the other objectives mentioned above, leaving it open as to how they would be achieved. The ‘mechanisms for dialogue’ were not explained, nor their purpose. It was also unclear what the intended confidence-building measures would be, and to what extent the plan was to initiate reconciliation processes or just support indigenous ones. Responsibility for reintegration of former combatants was to be given to the Division of Economic, Financial and Development Affairs. No one was assigned responsibility for other reconciliation and conflict resolution related tasks. The report stated that UNTAET personnel would have appropriate training in human rights and international humanitarian law, including child and gender-related provisions. Moreover, in the exercise of its duties, the Special Representative was to ‘be advised by offices for political, legal constitutional and electoral and human rights affairs’. There were no similar provisions ensuring capacity for conflict management and reconciliation. So while there were mentions of reconciliation activities, these were vaguely presented and allotted little capacity.

The status of this hastily composed 15-page document making up the Secretary General’s report (of which five pages are a report about recent developments and urgent needs), is not entirely clear. UNTAET’s mandate, laid down by the Security Council on 25 October does not endorse it as a plan, and other planning efforts took place as UNTAET moved on. Senior UN representatives suggested that the report was not a planning document\(^\text{32}\). According to the UN Secretary General’s briefing to the Security Council on 28 November 2000, a political calendar for the final phase of transition was applied\(^\text{33}\). However, a comprehensive planning document for UNTAET’s nation-building was never developed. Major General Michael Smith, involved in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) planning in New York and later in developing the military component of UNTAET, observes that UNTAET was ‘unable to start its mission with a coherent strategic (corporate) business plan’ adding that ‘once deployed, the day to day problems further hindered the development of such a plan’\(^\text{34}\). Given the monumental challenge of building a new country, the lack of overall planning is surprising.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Sergio Vieira de Mello, met with Xanana Gusmao in East Timor late 1999 to agree on a strategy for the transitional administration, or as ex-Deputy SRSG David Harland terms it: ‘to map out a ‘post-planning

\(^{32}\) Email of 24.05.11 from former Head of DPKO Jean-Marie Guéhenno and interview 07-08 June 11 in East Timor with Assistant Secretary General, UNMIT, Finn Reske-Nielsen


\(^{34}\) Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 103.
The many topics listed by Harland as being discussed did not include reconciliation or conflict resolution. The agreed priorities were:

- Security
- Law and order
- Conditions for economic growth
- Functioning governance institutions

The UN Secretary-General visited East Timor in February 2000, and requested another planning effort, asking the SRSG to establish benchmarks to guide the mission’s activities. The key areas, presented in the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council of 26 July 2000\(^{36}\) were:

- to ensure security during the transitional period and arrangements for East Timor’s security once it is independent;
- to establish a credible system of justice in which fundamental human rights are respected;
- to achieve a reasonable level of reconstruction of public services and infrastructure;
- to establish an administration that is financially sustainable; and
- to manage a political transition to independence, culminating in the adoption of a constitution and democratic elections.

Again, reconciliation and conflict resolution were not part of the equation. David Harland’s report does not mention the suggested benchmarks, but details seven goals with a total of 23 sub-items that were defined as UNTAET priorities for the last part of 1999 and the first half of 2000. These were partly overlapping and partly different from both the Secretary General’s report of 4 October 1999 and the benchmark areas mentioned in the Secretary General’s report of 26 July 2000\(^{37}\). So although there were planning activities, these could hardly be characterized as forming an adequate strategic process. Again, reconciliation and conflict resolution were not among the goals and not mentioned in the sub-items.\(^{38}\)

In terms of planning, it therefore appears that reconciliation is only touched upon in the 4 October report to the Security Council and does not figure as an element in later objectives or benchmarks. Assuming that the Secretary General's report was not a planning document, as maintained by senior UN representatives, there does not appear to have been any substantial plan for reconciliation and conflict resolution. Here one might observe that without the understanding provided by a comprehensive conflict analysis, the UN was not in a position to make such plans adequately. Analyses by UNTAET were generally brief and either situational or problem-specific. They would be submitted separately or as part of the mission’s regular internal reporting to the UN Headquarters\(^{39}\) and were clearly insufficient to provide the understanding needed of East Timor’s complex conflict landscape.

As observed, the late start of preparations for UNTAET and DPKO’s stretched resources did not allow for proper analysis and planning. The UNTAET operation was neither tasked with

\(^{35}\) Harland. *UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 5.


\(^{39}\) Interview in East Timor with William Gary Gray Chief, Political Affairs, UNMIT 08. June 2011.
nor staffed to do the comprehensive multi-faceted analysis needed. The need for conflict analysis could however have been addressed in other ways, had it been a priority. The number of research institutions taking an interest in East Timor and the generous funding available for the peace process early on suggest that outsourcing of conflict analysis under the UN administration might have been a practical solution.

Unlike UNTAET, the following UNMISET mission was founded on a clear plan, included in the Secretary General’s report to the Security Council of 17 April 2002. In line with the mandate, the activities outlined in the plan were primarily focused on institution-building and security. While the tasks for UN organizations operating in East Timor are listed in the plan, only the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR), is mentioned as having some responsibility related to reconciliation, conducting reintegration activities.

The plans for the UNOTIL operation which followed UNMISET in May 2005, were presented in the Secretary General’s report to the Security Council of 12 May. The primary task of the mission was to phase out peace operations and pave the way for a development programme, while providing support to the Timorese police/justice sector, military and helping to strengthen human rights. The Secretary General’s report states that support would be provided to CAVR’s follow-up mechanism to be established once the mission was complete. Reconciliation was otherwise not a subject.40

The Secretary General’s report of 13 February 200441 to the Security Council stated that the Secretariat had undertaken ‘in-depth analysis of the likely requirements of Timor-Leste after 20 May 2004’. The same report contains alarming information on a confrontation between the army and the police, where the army detained several police officers. However, the proposals for future assistance, which specify the need for continued development of the National Police force, does not touch upon the need for reconciliation or conflict resolution.42 There are no other indications of conflict analysis being conducted by UNMISET or UNOTIL.

So without mandates aiming at reconciliation and conflict resolution, without the conflict analysis needed to inform the mission, and without explicit plans for reconciliation and conflict resolution, how did UNTAET and the two following missions handle these challenges?

Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution Activities

Despite the lack of mandates, analysis and planning for the transition period, the UN missions’ reports to the Security Council reflect a number of important activities that did seek to address reconciliation and conflict resolution. However, as the discussion below will reveal, these efforts made inadequate provision for sustained political dialogue on national unity (especially between the CNRT and FRETILIN); did not engage deeply enough with perpetrators of atrocities; gave not attention to the problem of martial arts groups; and lacked a robust monitoring mechanism.

UNTAET was active in promoting refugee return from Indonesia, facilitating cross-border dialogue on different levels. It launched a programme called “The future of democracy in East Timor”, targeting a broad cross-section of East Timorese society and promoting civic education on constitutional development, the rule of law, as well as political education. UNTAET also promoted the free flow of information and ideas by supporting two local newspapers and two news magazines and through its own operations (radio, limited television broadcasts, fortnightly newsletters, and training for the East Timorese). Many Timorese found the civic education programme insignificant, but gave the UN credit for trying, suggesting an appreciation on the part of local actors that the mission did not have capacity to do more.43 UNTAET conducted human rights training through the UN police and non-governmental organizations and interacted with local community leaders to develop a culture of tolerance. Dialogue was held with community leaders in Viqueque about communal conflict and the need to strengthen order and oppose violence. UNTAET did also make some efforts to bring political actors together for dialogue. However, Timorese politicians and civil servants mostly found these efforts of little value. Some suggested these activities efforts only involved a small number of leaders, whereas a much broader inclusive effort was required, involving all political parties and a broad range of civil actors in a dialogue on reconciliation and development.44

A land dispute mediation programme was also established, but its effectiveness was limited in that it depended on political decisions and legislation that did not materialize.

Apart from the efforts of returning refugees from Indonesia, the UN missions’ most significant achievement was the establishment of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) with the combined mandate of investigating and reporting on serious crime, and conducting reconciliation between victims and perpetrators of lesser crime. Established on 15 July 2001, the Commission’s work started in February 2002 and operated till October 2005, outlasting UNTAET and UNMISET, continuing well into the UNOTIL operation.

CAVR was able to meet some of the requirements of reconciliation, although its mandate was partly vague. The UNTAET report of July 2001 on establishment of CAVR Article 3.1.g) lists ‘Promoting reconciliation’ as one of its objectives, but without further specification, while Article 3.3 says the Commission may conduct all such activities that are consistent with the fulfilment of its mandate.45 All the detailed directions of this UN regulation are about the truth-seeking and community reconciliation, meaning the reintegration of ex-combatants through dialogue processes between victims and offenders. There is no suggestion as to what other reconciliation efforts might be needed. However, despite the vague mandate on reconciliation in general, CAVR was able to identify and carry out a variety of reconciliation activities. In addition to the community reconciliation programme, a series of television-broadcast national hearings were held, involving victims and perpetrators as well as politicians. Healing workshops were held at CAVR’s headquarters, and community profile workshops were held to discuss the impact of the conflicts. An outreach programme for refugees in West Timor was...
launched, as was an urgent reparation scheme for victims with critical needs. In all, there is reason to believe CAVR’s work made a real difference for a large number of Timorese.

Both UNMISET and UNOTIL followed up on the CAVR efforts, providing technical support. Contributions from other parts of the UN system were also important for the stabilisation of peace. UNDP and other UN organisations, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), contributed to institution building, programmes on employment for vulnerable groups, community development, poverty reduction, infrastructure and entrepreneurship training inter alia. Many of these efforts would have positive effects on reconciliation. The UNHCR was directly involved in reconciliation processes through comprehensive return and reintegration activities.

What was missing?

**The Mandates.** Many of the challenges underlying the 2006 crisis were already in existence in 1999, and there was a clear need to focus on reconciliation and conflict resolution from the beginning. To the extent mandates matter in terms of direction and mindset, these needs should have been clearly reflected in the mandates from the start. To include reconciliation in the UNMIT mandate in 2006 was seven years too late.

**Planning.** Limited planning activities had taken place, but both a strategic planning process and an overall planning document were missing. As a consequence there were no strategic priorities identified that addressed conflict resolution and reconciliation needs.

**Analysis.** As suggested above, any peace operation should start with an adequate conflict analysis to ensure understanding of the conflict landscape. In East Timor, the deep divide in the society, old and new wounds and the many conflict-related vulnerabilities that existed in 1999 suggested a clear need for a comprehensive and profound effort.

The analysis should have included mapping of all existing conflicts and stakeholders, the threats they represented, the potential for new or changing conflicts and the need for reconciliation and conflict resolution. To provide this, a profound understanding of East Timor’s history was required, and of the connections between past and present conflicts. A thorough analysis of relations between different ethnic groups should have been a requirement, along with analysis of the relationship between political actors and different groups and actors in the informal sector, including the martial groups and gangs. The analysis would have needed to include socio-economic, demographic and psychological perspectives. A relevant conflict analysis must also take into account the likely effects of the peacebuilding process as well as other trends and developments in society. Providing such an understanding of the past, present and future challenges is a complex task, a fact illustrated by analyses provided by the following non UN actors:

- A report of July 2004 from Columbia University termed ‘Timor Leste Conflict Assessment’ offers some important insights\(^46\). The report is, however, brief on historical perspectives and the general divide in the Timorese population related to foreign powers, as well as on identification of socio-economic factors influencing the

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\(^46\) Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR) at Columbia University, Fo Liman and Ba Malu-Hakat Ba Oin, *Timor Leste Conflict Assessment: Final Report* (31 July 2004).
conflict landscape.\textsuperscript{47} A simultaneous report from Columbia University and the FAFO Institute of Applied Social Science on the social and economic conditions in East Timor provides comprehensive baseline data on current socio-economic conditions for development of the territory, but does not establish their connection with conflict equations\textsuperscript{48}.

- A conflict assessment conducted for USAID in 2004 contains a strikingly accurate prediction of some conflict scenarios, but misses out on ethnic divisions and terms the Timorese as ‘a generally unified people’\textsuperscript{49}.
- Relevant demographic factors are presented in a European Union report by Josh Trindade and Bryant Castro\textsuperscript{50}. One such factor highlighted in the report is the trend for the younger population, with different ethnic backgrounds, to move from the countryside to the capital and other urban centres of East Timor. (The authors refer to statistical indications that young populations pose a higher risk of violence than older ones, observing that the 2006 fighting took place mostly in the cities).
- Paulo Castro Seixas has offered an analysis from the angle of social anthropology, including political conflicts, the East-West conflict, a conflict between the Timorese who stayed and the ones who left, ethno-linguistic divisions, a conflict between generations and more\textsuperscript{51}.
- James Scambary rendered an incisive analysis of the dynamics of the 2006 conflict, and identified a variety of actors who contributed to the crisis\textsuperscript{52}. While his analysis was presented in 2009 after years of changes in the conflict landscape, a similar effort in 1999 would clearly have been a valuable contribution.\textsuperscript{53}
- The Timorese NGO CEPAD’s report of September 2009, based on local hearings (conducted in cooperation with Interpeace, Geneva) points out a number of potential obstacles to peace, including the relationship between modern democracy and traditions of East Timor, lack of local participation in development, a disconnect between politicians and the population\textsuperscript{54}, large-scale unemployment, corruption, immunity for the privileged, lack of peace dividend for different groups, language problems and a lack of national sentiment.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{47} The report’s reservation against circulation and citation prevents a detailed discussion.
\textsuperscript{48} International Conflict Resolution Program School of International and Public Affairs (ICRP) at Columbia University, Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor (Joint Publication of ICRP and FAFO Institute for Applied Social Science). \url{http://purl.pt/915/1/cdl/ta200/TA201.pdf}.
\textsuperscript{50} Jose ‘Josh’ Trindade and Bryant Castro, Technical Assistance to the National Dialogue Process in Timor-Leste: Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: The Lorosa’e – Loromoum Conflict from a Traditional Perspective (6 June 2007), \url{http://indopubs.com/Trindade_Castro_Rethinking_Timorese_Identity.pdf}.
\textsuperscript{52} Scambary, ‘Anatomy of a Conflict.’
\textsuperscript{53} Scambary’s analysis is also a reminder of the need to renew conflict analysis as time passes and conflict aspects change.
\textsuperscript{54} Important observations/analysis of our disregard for such factors are offered in books and articles by Oliver Richmond. Oliver P. Richmond, Liberal Peace Transitions: A Rethink is Urgent (Open Democracy, 19 November 2009), \url{http://www.opendemocracy.net/oliver-p-richmond/liberal-peace-transitions-rethink-is-urgent}. 48

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47 The report’s reservation against circulation and citation prevents a detailed discussion.
48 International Conflict Resolution Program School of International and Public Affairs (ICRP) at Columbia University, Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor (Joint Publication of ICRP and FAFO Institute for Applied Social Science), \url{http://purl.pt/915/1/cdl/ta200/TA201.pdf}.
52 Scambary, ‘Anatomy of a Conflict.’
53 Scambary’s analysis is also a reminder of the need to renew conflict analysis as time passes and conflict aspects change.
54 Important observations/analysis of our disregard for such factors are offered in books and articles by Oliver Richmond. Oliver P. Richmond, Liberal Peace Transitions: A Rethink is Urgent (Open Democracy, 19 November 2009), \url{http://www.opendemocracy.net/oliver-p-richmond/liberal-peace-transitions-rethink-is-urgent}.
Although much of CEPAD’s presentation relates to developments since the peace-building process started, some observations might have come up as ‘flags’, had such an analysis taken place at an early stage of the peace operations. An organization like CEPAD did not exist in 1999, but East Timor’s own university was established in 1986, which may well have been able to contribute to the analysis needed.

A thorough conflict analysis, including the above elements, would require expertise in fields like social anthropology, sociology, political science, economy and social psychology, as well as thorough knowledge of Timorese history, culture and traditions. Adequate field research, including interviews with traditional and religious leaders, politicians, representatives of various interest groups, war veterans, women, youth and others would be needed. If a carefully selected team had addressed this task at the beginning of the UNTAET’s mission, the UN would have acquired a better understanding of the conflict equations that derailed the peace process in 2006. But can we assume that such an analysis would have identified the factors that led to the crisis?

Among the conflicts that were relevant in 1999, three stand out as critical in 2006.

- Firstly, there is the relationship between the political actors. The Timorese leaders did not cooperate to resolve the crisis. Several main actors tended to their own interests, some even joining the action, handing out weapons to civilians. Possibly the political antagonism and lack of cooperation was a result of the tension within CNRT, referred to in the Independent Special Commission’s report (p5), but this aspect might also be a reflection of older differences.

  Besides the political parties, an array of different political front groups, war veterans and social groupings with varying political affiliations emerged after independence. Some of these groups contributed actively to the 2006 havoc. However, in 1999 the equation was less complex. The fact that actors who had been killing each other in large numbers were still part of the political equation should have been an additional ‘flag’. In general, there is a risk that ex-fighters taking on political roles in a new democracy may be tempted to fight with democratic means. In East Timor, the political divide came to open expression early on as FRETILIN withdrew from CNRT in 2000. Even if an analysis should fail to reveal the full truth about the political landscape, it stands to reason that it would have created an understanding of the need to address political interaction and cooperation at an early stage.

- Secondly, a factor that became crucial in 2006 was the East-West (‘Kaladi-Firaku’) rift in the population. As mentioned above, this was not an easily visible conflict aspect in 1999, and a senior UN representative could only recall one occasion where there was an indication of the problem: ‘we heard some commotion from the market, and our local staff said, ‘It is only the guys from Bacau (a city in the East) who have come to beat up the Westerners.’”

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56 UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Report, 75.
57 For an account of these groups see Scambary, ‘Anatomy of a Conflict.’
58 Interview in East Timor 07 June 2011.
Paulo Seixas Castro, analyzing the East-Timor conflicts, terms the East-West issue as one of the divisions ‘always ready to be triggered and to escalate into crisis’. He also notes that, ‘among many other things, the Firaku claim to be the oldest in Timor (“those from inside”); the Kaladi accuse the Firaku of having been on the colonial side in the great revolt of 1912; the Firaku accuse the Kaladi of having been “the big door” of the Indonesian invasion’.\(^59\)

Jose Trinidade and Bryant Castro, noting that the eastern area with forested mountains was better suited for guerrilla warfare and favoured the resistance in the East, boosting stereotypes, observe: ‘Eastern Lorosa’e claimed to represent resistance fighters and the true custodians of an independent East Timor. In contrast, the western-based Loromou were stereotyped as the accomplices of Indonesian occupation and anti-independence militia members.’\(^60\)

Mario Vegas Carrascalao, leader of the political party UDT from 1974 and governor of East Timor from 1982 to 1992, offered an additional perspective: ‘There are old differences between Easterners and Westerners. The West was in general wealthier and its education level higher. People in the East had to work harder for their livelihood, as the soil was less fertile. Even in Indonesian times, Easterners and Westerners settling in Dili would live in different parts of the city. Later emerged the issue that the Easterners had kept up the resistance fight longer’.\(^61\)

It appears reasonable to assume that after 1999, socio-economic factors merged with concepts related to the resistance fight and the idea of Westerners being closer to the Indonesians, leading to an increased level of antagonism. Although not easily visible, the East-West issue was serious enough to develop into a critical divide within the East Timor army. It also contributed to a conflict between the army and the police. Whereas the army was basically made up by resistance fighters from FALINTIL, the police had a higher percentage of officers from the West, including officers who had served under the Indonesian regime. This led to conflicts even within the police. While there was little in 1999 to suggest to outsiders that geography would become a major aspect of conflict, the rift in the Timorese population over the relationship with Indonesia was a striking feature. If this feature had been subjected to a profound analysis, one might have come to identify and understand the East-West perspective and the threat it represented.

- A third critical factor in the 2006 crisis was the **martial art groups and gangs**. These groups, which came to play an active role during the 2006 riots, were a well-known aspect of East Timor society. A proper analysis would have enhanced the UN’s understanding of the risk they represented, particularly if they were seen in the perspective of the East-West conflict and political conflicts.

The UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor Leste was mandated ‘to establish the facts and circumstances relevant to the incidents that took place on 28 and 29

\(^{59}\) Seixas, ‘Dualism,’79.

\(^{60}\) Trinidade and Castro, Technical Assistance, 12.

\(^{61}\) Interview in East Timor 11 June 2011.
April and 23, 24 and 25 May 2006 and related events or issues that contributed to the crisis. The Commission’s report does make observations about communal divisions, including the East-West distinctions, which ‘infected both F-DTL (the army) and PNTL (the police)’. It also observes that the President’s reference to the East-West issue in a speech on March 23, 2006 was perceived by many as divisive, and that multiple disturbances took place over the next few days. However, the Commission finds that ‘the crisis can be explained largely by the frailty of state institutions and the weakness of the rule of law’.

Given that frail state institutions and a weak rule of law are aspects commonly found in the post-violence phase of peacebuilding, one might have hoped the Commission would discuss the UN’s handling of the factors which put the state institutions to test. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and the issues of UN mandates, conflict analysis and planning were not addressed. In sum, East Timor offers a striking demonstration of the importance of conflict analysis in peacebuilding contexts, showing that aspects that are invisible on the surface or seem insignificant, may turn out to be crucial.

**Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution Activities**

It is not possible to prove in hindsight that a comprehensive conflict analysis would have led to more constructive conflict management. What one may observe is that certain reconciliation and conflict resolution efforts were needed, and that a proper analysis early on might have shown this need. The new nation depended on its political actors interacting constructively on nation-building. Or, as one senior Government member put it: ‘They should have got together and agreed on one objective only: National Unity’.

The UN appears to have given insufficient attention to the need for political reconciliation and cooperation. Some efforts were made to induce dialogue between leading political actors, but most Timorese representatives of political parties and civic society seem united in the view that this was largely a missing element in the UNTAET approach. Mari Alkatiri, East Timor’s first prime minister, claimed that ‘the UNTAET leadership primarily chose to relate to Xanana Gusmao, Ramos Horta and CNRT, and not to FRETILD, the biggest political party’. He believed that an initiative like the Maubisse Dialogue, taken by the Catholic Church in conjunction with President Ramos Horta in 2011 to initiate dialogue between the leaders of CNRT and FRETILIN, should have been launched early on. An equivalent of the later dialogue programmes in Burundi or the Central African Republic, (see p23/24) might have also been considered for East Timor.

As for the need for national reconciliation, the CAVR report offers important perspectives. The CAVR programme’s main component was Community Reintegration, and 1,371 perpetrators of minor crime successfully went through a community reconciliation and reintegration process.

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63 Ibid., 2.
64 Interview in East Timor 09 June 2011 with a senior civil servant; Paulo Castro Seixas observes on this aspect: ‘What failed in East Timor is that the State was constructed without being given the necessary tools to construct Nationalism.’ See Seixas, ‘Dualism,’ 81.
65 Interviews with parliamentarians and representatives of civil organisations in East Timor 09-11 June 2011.
66 Interviewed 10 June 2011, Mari Alkatiri believed this initiative would bring reconciliation between the main political rivals.
process. However, CAVR observes that at least 3,000 additional perpetrators could have participated\(^{67}\), meaning that less than one-third of ‘eligible’ perpetrators were included.

The fact that reconciliation cases had to be pre-screened by a public prosecutor and submitted to a court for endorsement afterwards clearly limited CAVR’s outreach, as did its duty to stop the reconciliation process and report serious crime to the prosecutor if detected. Without arguing for another kind of Commission (like the often lauded South-African approach without a justice component), one might observe as a matter of fact that very few perpetrators of crime have ever been charged, meaning the vast majority of Timorese victims have received neither justice nor reconciliation. Given the limitations of CAVR’s outreach, the report’s recommendations appear very important, namely the:

- Continuation of CAVR’s work
- Establishment of a new entity for broad-scale reconciliation in the communities
- Pursuit of justice for the victims

None of this happened. The report received little enthusiasm from President Xanana Gusmao, who was opposed to the pursuit of justice, favouring a conciliatory approach towards Indonesia\(^{68}\). He did not reject the reconciliation activities recommended by CAVR, but neither did he welcome them, and his reaction may have had a chilling effect. However, by September 2011 a draft law on an Institute of Memory, intended to become the entity implementing the CAVR recommendations, and another on a National Reparation Programme for victims, were pending in Parliament but facing resistance from Parliamentarians as well as from war veterans who claimed that their interests should be dealt with first.\(^{69}\)

The time perspective was important. The CAVR started its work only two and half years into UNTAET’s mission. It would probably have achieved much more had it started its activities as early as possible after the UN commenced its operations. If an early, profound conflict analysis and adequate planning had been conducted, CAVR’s work could have started early in 2000 instead of 2002. If the needs were properly mapped, part of the process might have been the national, large-scale community-based reconciliation that CAVR later suggested. A possible new entity for broad-scale reconciliation in the communities would have had the potential of reaching out to the population at large, including both Easterners and Westerners, autonomists and proponents of independence. Considering CAVR’s observation that ‘the war reached every village’ and ‘profoundly influenced the lives of all East Timorese people‘,\(^{70}\) this should have been a priority in 1999/2000 and not an ignored suggestion six years later.

Addressing the martial arts groups issue adequately would have been a huge task, particularly because extensive unemployment was part of the problem. However, a dedicated large-scale programme for reconciliation among martial arts groups combined with a structure for the organised and legal practice of martial arts might have helped ameliorate the problems. Addressing the issue of gangs outside the martial arts realm would no doubt have been

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\(^{67}\) CAVR, Chega!, 23 and 27.


\(^{69}\) La'o Hamutuk, Proposed laws on Reparations and Memory Institute (7 July 2010, updated 1 March 2012), http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Reparations/10ReparIndex.htm.

\(^{70}\) CAVR, Chega!, 13.
complicated, but given the indication in one study that 70% of the male population was connected to martial arts groups in 2005, a serious effort in this field could have made a difference. With the support of President Xanana Gusmao, a series of initiatives towards the martial arts groups were taken in 2005, and resulted in 14 groups signing a joint declaration in June against the use of violence amongst themselves. The Secretary-General, reporting on the subject, did not indicate who took the initiative and did not refer to it among the Contributions of the United Nations. Although a commendable effort, earlier and more comprehensive action should have been taken to address the martial art groups challenge.

**Monitoring.** The need for monitoring of conflicts in East Timor was essential from the beginning, but might have been crucial later on. In fairness to the UN operations in East Timor, the two-year transition period planned in 1999 and the steady reduction of UN operations and resources were hardly a proper basis for the assertive monitoring needed in 2005/2006. When the crisis was brewing in February 2006, Security Council members had long been pressing for an early conclusion of the East Timor ‘success story’, and some East Timorese leaders were also keen to see the UN leave. In this context, even UNOTIL’s information to UN Headquarters in January 2006 regarding the fact that leading Timorese politicians were sending their families out of the country, went unheeded. For the SRSG to sit the Timorese leaders down to discuss the crisis must have been anything but easy.

The conflict between the police and the army had been in evidence for some time before it became a factor in the 2006 crisis. The media, unlike the UN, also reported on conflicts within the police (UNTAET’s decision to include officers who had served under the Indonesian regime in the PNTL force, had been taken against FRETILIN’s advice, something former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri later termed a “time bomb”). The UN operations continually reported comprehensive multi-faceted UN support towards the development of the police force, as well as support to the military, but did not indicate any efforts to address the conflict between the two. After army soldiers detained a number of police officers in Lauten on January 25, 2004, the President responded by setting up a commission to assess the problem. The UN Secretary-General’s following report to the Security Council, recommended ‘strict action regarding those members of the F-FDTL members found responsible’, but did not discuss a possible programme or project to address the underlying conflicts. Even after an army attack on a police station in December 2004 prompted the UN Secretary-General to report that ‘there is a need to effectively address the strained relationship between the two security forces’, reports to the Security Council continued to focus on technical support and capacity building.

An interesting approach was reported by the UN Secretary-General in October 2003, suggesting UNMISET had ‘tried to further institutionalize cooperation on security issues with and among Timorese agencies’ inviting them to work together on information-sharing with a
view to gaining experience in information analysis and planning. District-level security committees, attended by the UN, are described as a useful forum for discussion of local security issues and coordination. However, no report mentions conflicts being addressed.

In retrospect, one might have wished to see UNTAET agree with the Timorese leaders on how to handle the transition phase from the beginning, including a clear joint commitment to cooperate closely on response to possible threats to the nation’s peace and stability. For such an agreement to be effective, there must however be a realistic timescale. It is a long time since Jean-Paul Lederach offered his well-founded opinion that it takes 20-plus years to reach a ‘desired future’, and that the need for peace-building design should be addressed in blocks of 5-10 years. Several Timorese in leading positions have suggested that 5 years might have been realistic for East Timor, had the UN agreed on a transition plan with local leaders from the start. Such a plan would, however, depend on the Security Council understanding the need for it.

The UN’s conflict management shortcomings in East Timor can only be understood in light of the UN Headquarters’ approach. By giving the task to DPKO and excluding DPA, the World Bank and the Timorese from the planning process, and by missing out on the need for a thorough conflict analysis as well as proper planning, the scene was set for insufficient focus on reconciliation and conflict resolution. For the sake of balance, one should observe that the UN operations did a comprehensive, and in many ways, successful job of institution-building and security, activities that were better defined and prepared for.

To conclude, the approach of UN peace operations in East Timor should have included:

- Security Council mandates including reconciliation and conflict resolution from the start and not only after the disaster in 2006;
- A more realistic time frame for the operations;
- A comprehensive conflict analysis;
- A better planning process for the transition period, including reconciliation and conflict resolution aspects;
- Clearly defined reconciliation objectives and activities, including:
  - A national reconciliation programme;
  - An early comprehensive dialogue and co-operation project for political actors with the purpose of fostering national unity;
  - A national project for martial arts groups, including reconciliation and conflict resolution;
- An agreement with local leaders on the transition process, including joint robust monitoring and follow-up activities.

2. Peacebuilding in Burundi and The Central African Republic

78 Interviews in East Timor with politicians and representatives of civil organizations 09-11 June 2011.
The PBC started its work in Burundi in January 2007 and in The Central African Republic (CAR) in June 2008, following requests from the respective governments. Whereas East Timor was the first case of the UN building a new state from scratch, in Burundi and CAR the governments were in charge of the peacebuilding process, giving the UN less freedom to shape and influence the process.

**The UN Mandates**

The mandate of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)\(^{79}\), defining its responsibilities in any peacebuilding effort, reads as follows:

- To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict recovery.

In the case of Burundi, the UN operations’ mandates in terms of conflict resolution and reconciliation have varied. The United Nations’ Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established in 1993, following a coup d’état. The purpose was to facilitate restoration of constitutional rule and later overseeing the implementation of the Arusha agreement of 28 August 2000\(^{80}\). The Secretary-General’s report of 16 March 2004, states that the mission was established ‘to support initiatives aimed at supporting peace and reconciliation initiatives in that country’.\(^{81}\) In 2004, a UN peacekeeping operation (also named ONUB) was established with a broad peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandate, but reconciliation and conflict resolution were not mentioned.\(^{82}\)

The next operation, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), starting simultaneously with PBC in January 2007, was termed an ‘integrated peacebuilding mission’ and had a comprehensive mandate, including to ‘strengthen the capacity of national institutions and civil society to address the root causes of conflict and to prevent, manage and resolve internal conflicts, particularly though reforms in the political and administrative spheres.’\(^{83}\) BINUB was also meant to support the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism, ‘including a truth and reconciliation commission and a special tribunal’\(^{84}\). In January 2011, a scaled-down UN mission termed the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) took over, ‘inheriting’ the BINUB mandate to support transitional justice but also authorized to ‘providing operational support to the functioning of these bodies’\(^{85}\). Moreover, BNUB was to

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\(^{79}\) The term ‘purpose’ was used by the General Assembly. See S/RES/1645.


\(^{84}\) Ibid., 3.

\(^{85}\) S/RES/1959 (2010), 3
promote and facilitate ‘dialogue between national actors and supporting mechanisms for broad-based participation in political life’.

Reconciliation was otherwise not mentioned.

In CAR, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) peace-building support office was established in 2000, also with a broad mandate, including one term reading ‘Assist national efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and mechanisms for fostering reconciliation and dialogue.’

BONUCA was replaced in early January 2010 by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), with a broadly worded mandate, but with no specific mention reconciliation or conflict resolution.

Apart from the UN intention to offer operational support to a transitional justice mechanism in Burundi, the mandates in both countries suggest support to development of indigenous capacity, without defining the direct UN involvement in conflict resolution and reconciliation. While the country operations’ mandates were given for one year at the time, the PBC initially committed its support for three years both in Burundi and CAR.

Planning for Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution

UN support to Burundi and CAR included comprehensive planning efforts. In both countries, the governments were helped to develop a Priority Plan for Peacebuilding, identifying prime peacebuilding needs. Next, a Framework for Peacebuilding was developed with PBC’s support, intended to unite the government and its partner around a shared set of peacebuilding objectives. The Frameworks were supported by matrices with indicators, benchmarks and commitments (In Burundi, these were found in a separate planning document, named Tracking and Monitoring Mechanism).

Both these Frameworks identified objectives related to good governance and the rule of law, and to security sector reform (including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration). There were also different national priorities. In the case of CAR, these included the so-called Development Poles in CAR, while in Burundi they included settlement of land issues and the completion of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the government and the Hutu rebel group Palipehutu-FNL.

88 United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2009/5 (7 April 2009). The mandate does include a reference to recommendations from the Inclusive Dialogue (see 25 ) which according to the CAR Framework for Peacebuilding included la. establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission.
89 The Security Council recommends that PBC terminate its support in a given country ‘when foundations for sustainable peace and development are established’ or subject to request by national authorities. See United Nations Security Resolution 1645, S/RES/1645, 5.
90 Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi, Strategic note 1, February 2007, PBSO-6 March 2007, http://www.peacebuilderscenter.jp/parts/20101213-17/20101214Material_Takeuchi.pdf and Republique Centraficaine Plan Prioritaire pour la Consolidation de la Paix, Juin 2008, See ANALYSE SITUATION SECURITAIRE DE L’A RCA, http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&q=la+RCA+vit+dans+un+environnement+marque+par+l%27instabilit%c3%a9%2c+&rlz=1T4ADRA_enNO367NO368&espv=2&ie=UTF-8&client=firefox-a&rlz=1T4ADRA_enNO367NO368&ei=1T4ADRA_enNQ367NO368&q=la+RCA+vit+dans+un+environnement+marque%26%23xa9%26par%26%23x80%2699%26instabilit%26%23xa9%26c
92 UN Peacebuilding Commission, PBC/1/BDI/4, 1.
To analyze the appropriateness of the entire planning processes and documents is beyond the scope of this article. However, the planning process did provide parameters and some guidance for the peacebuilding process. This represents progress compared to the East Timor operations, but it is still questionable whether the planning processes were based on the kind of analysis that complex conflict landscapes demand.

In Burundi, the annexes of the Arusha Peace Agreement of 2004 did include some analysis, but the focus was primarily on the peacebuilding efforts needed rather than a deeper analysis of conflict perspectives. DPKO conducted Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) in Burundi in 2007 and 2009. The reports included some conflict analysis that was available to the Burundi officers of the PBC, but the extent and value of these internal UN documents are hard to assess. (UN staff characterizations span from ‘a large section of conflict analysis’ to ‘simple’, and ‘far less profound than the Arusha Agreement annexes’).

In 2010, a DPA-led Strategic Assessment Mission (SAM) to Burundi was conducted by UN and World Bank staff, assessing the needs for future UN support. This assessment included some conflict analysis, but again UN staff opinions vary on value and extent. However, none of these analyses were multi-disciplinary, and more importantly, only a scenario section of the report was shared with the Government. The value of this sharing is hard to judge, but it is unlikely to cover the need for a profound understanding of all relevant conflict aspects. Surprisingly, the SAM was not formally shared with PBC, but information would probably come across informally.

In the case of CAR, there were SAMs both in 2008 and in 2010, but these were not shared with the Government, and again the extent of conflict analysis is unknown.

Late in 2010, well after the completion of the Framework for Peacebuilding, BINUCA engaged an external consultant to perform a conflict analysis. The report, dated October 2010 (which was internal but kindly shared by BINUCA for purposes of the present research) is a 20-page document, based on two weeks of joint fieldwork with two local consultants, and has some five pages covering ‘Causes Profond de Conflit’. It was meant to inform the development of the United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework, aimed at projecting ‘a shared UN vision of the strategic objectives in support of the country’s progress towards peace consolidation’, and the UN assistance Framework (UNDAF). It was not shared with the Government.

Instead of helping to establish a strong knowledge base before the development of a framework for peacebuilding, the UN looked to the Government for the knowledge needed. In the report presenting the Peacebuilding Framework in June 2009, the UN Secretary General

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93 See Arusha Peace Agreement for Burundi with Annex on Conflicts,
94 Email exchange with UN staff in September and phone conversation 05 October 2011.
95 Email exchange with Stephen Jackson, Chief of Staff BNUB United Nations Office in Burundi in September 2011.
96 Ibid.
97 Phone conversation with UN staff 20 September 2011.
98 Some BINUCA staff found it too brief, also remarking that the interviews were mainly conducted in Bangui. Email exchange November 2011 with BINUCA staff member.
100 Email exchange with BINUCA staff member in November 2011.

The use of such a brief external analysis appears to substantiate concerns expressed by Mats Berdal on lack of UN analytical capacity. Mats Berdal, *Building Peace After War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 165.
refers to a CAR Government study of 2005, stating that ‘the main challenges that the republic must deal with during the current stage of post conflict rebuilding were clearly established’. Moreover, ‘Activities planned under this strategic Framework must build on recent peacebuilding actions and successes, without duplicating existing peacebuilding activities and strategies’\textsuperscript{101}.

This confidence in a four-year-old source is surprising, given CAR’s changing conflict landscape, well described in the International Crisis Group reports \textsuperscript{102}. Additionally, the reference to the 2005 study appears to be misleading. According to PBSO staff, this ‘study’ refers to the Government’s “Programme de Politique Générale” outlined to the National Assembly on 8 August 2005 by the Prime Minister, and used to develop the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper\textsuperscript{103}, a main planning document, albeit not containing much conflict analysis\textsuperscript{104}. The Programme de Politique itself is not available as a study or report. But even if it were, basing peacebuilding planning primarily on this is not an obvious choice. The CAR Government was very much a part of the conflict equation, and frequently accused of stark partisan behaviour.

The PBC in Burundi took a similar approach, asking the Government to present its priorities early on through the above-mentioned Priority Plan for Peacebuilding. This strategy reflects the Commission’s current tendency to privilege that target state’s ‘ownership’ of peacebuilding, and to ensure that the PBC is seen as working in partnerships with, rather than challenging the authority of, that state’s Government. But as much as it is the Government’s prerogative to decide on peacebuilding activities in its own country, and as much as the UN wanted to avoid duplications, the establishment of the PBC represented an opportunity to bring in a more authoritative and independent source of ideas, analysis, and recommendations. One possibility that might have been pursued was the involvement of a highly qualified multi-disciplinary external team of researchers, who could have worked under guidelines that would not necessarily have compromised the Government’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{105}

Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution Activities

To what extent did the Burundi and CAR peacebuilding processes meet the needs for reconciliation/ conflict resolution?

In terms of numbers of peacebuilding activities, the PBF made a difference. In Burundi, 35 million USD was granted to the Peacebuilding Fund and allocated to 18 different peacebuilding projects. In CAR, a total of 30.8 million USD was allocated to a total of 26 different projects. These added to comprehensive development support and peacebuilding efforts supported by the UN, the World Bank, IMF, EU and other actors. The PBC also contributed to the peacebuilding efforts through persistent advocacy for funding and continuous support to the Government, which may have gone some way to compensate for

\textsuperscript{101} UN Peacebuilding Commission, PBC/3/CAF/7/1, 4 and 2.


\textsuperscript{103} Email exchange October 2011 with Peacebuilding Officer Phillip Helminger, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office.


the fact that PBC lacked operational capacity. However, only a limited number of the PBF projects related to reconciliation and conflict resolution.

In Burundi, four out of 18 PBF-funded projects addressed reconciliation and conflict resolution issues:

- **The Dialogues Forum** (‘Cadres de Dialogue’) was an innovative project that assisted political parties, media and civil society in developing dialogue as a tool for democratic governance. A tangible result was a Governmental decree of October 2009, which, drawing on political consensus, established the Permanent Forum for Dialogue for accredited political parties. The Forum, which aimed at strengthening the political party system and promoting dialogue on issues of national interest, later faced problems when some politicians, discouraged by the lack of implementation, began boycotting the meetings. However the project did boost political dialogue for some time, and could offer valuable lessons. An external evaluation report in March 2010 expressed the need for stakeholders to participate in peacebuilding implementation and proposed engagement of the community in a national dialogue, but also suggested ‘in-depth evaluation of this project to learn lessons from the innovative process and design used’.

- **The Local Tribunals project**, which included rehabilitation of 32 low-level courts, was termed by the External Independent Evaluation as providing mid-level dividend, being useful, but somewhat flawed due to lack of consultation with the local population.

- **The Land Disputes Project** supported the resolution of over 2,250 land disputes and appears to have been of high immediate value to the beneficiaries. However, the External Independent Evaluation termed the institutional dividend as mid-level, because the project was limited to UNHCR working areas where refugees were returning, and it seemed uncertain that the formal justice system would recognize the project.

- **The Transitional Justice Project** related to national reconciliation, which the Government’s Priority Plan termed as ‘the basis for peacebuilding in Burundi’. The project tentatively included both provisions for transitional justice and a national reconciliation commission. However, by September 2011 there was still no Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Burundi, and no transitional justice. One reason may have been disagreement between the Government and the UN, referred to in Burundi’s Framework for Peacebuilding. According to UN staff, the disagreement was about justice. The UN found the Government’s plans for amnesty too wide-
reaching, and did not accept the Government’s desire to have the Reconciliation Commission decide on prosecution instead of the public prosecutor.\footnote{Phone conversation with senior UN staff member, PBSO, 20 September 2011.}

In CAR, a notable reconciliation effort was initiated in early 2008, before PBC entered the stage, as PBSO provided some 800,000 USD as an Emergency Window grant for development of the Inclusive Political Dialogue, involving the Government, rebel groups, the political opposition, civil society and other relevant stakeholders. Later on, both PBF and other donors contributed to the project. Comprehensive talks ended with agreed recommendations on improved governance, including the creation of a Government of national unity, improved security, economic development, the holding of municipal elections in 2009 and legislative and presidential elections in 2010. In fact, a multi-party Government was established on 20 January 2009. Although the CAR President was accused of limiting the power given to political opponents\footnote{International Crisis Group, Central African Republic, 4.} and some actors reverted to rebellion for this reason, this reconciliation initiative deserves attention and due analysis. East Timor, for its part, might have benefitted from a similar dialogue project at an early stage of the state-building process.

In addition to the emergency allocation, PDF granted 10 million USD to CAR in 2008 and 20 million USD in 2010. The funds were allocated to 26 peacebuilding projects in all, of which only the following four were about conflict resolution and reconciliation:

- A peace radio project ‘Radios communautaires pour le renforcement de la cohésion sociale’, which targeted reinforcement of social cohesion in affected communities.
- A project termed ‘Expression et Reconciliation’ aimed at reconciliatory influence through works of art, media, seminars/discussions and public events.
- A project ‘Renforcement de l’offre de services judiciaires et facilitation de l’accès à une justice de qualité’, aimed at enhancing the technical standards of courts, providing training for judges and rendering legal support to weak groups.
- ‘Éducation à la Citoyenneté et Promotion de la Culture de la Paix—’a project handled by UNICEF and UNHCR in conjunction with the Government aimed at peace advocacy and /training of teachers, children, artists, community leaders and more, but also ensuring 17,000 children access to school.

The establishment of a National Reconciliation Commission, one of the CAR Government’s commitments in the Peacebuilding Framework, was not reflected in the PBF portfolio\footnote{The Government’s commitment to ‘establish structures and frameworks for exchange between former combatants and the affected communities was also missing. UN Peacebuilding Commission, PBC/3/CAF/7, 23.}. \footnote{UN Peacebuilding Commission, PBC/3/CAF/7, 23.} (To avoid confusion, one should observe that a National Reconciliation Forum, established by the CAR President was active for six weeks in 2003\footnote{Justice in Perspective. http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/africa/central-african-republic/national-reconciliation-forum.html}). Neither was it mentioned in the UN Secretary-General’s report on PBSO’s activities of 12 June 2009 or in the Secretary-General’s conclusions and recommendations of the first biannual review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic of 11 February 2010. The UN Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in CAR of 7 January 2010 observes that ‘a limited number of actions have been on the radar of the
Commission during the reporting period. The implications of leaving the national reconciliation commission off the radar, are perhaps reflected in the UN Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council of June 2009, July 2010 and May 2011, all observing problems related to ethnic conflicts in the northeast of the country. While the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 30 July 2010 mentions the need for ‘meaningful advances in national reconciliation’, none of the reports mentions any advance towards the national reconciliation commission. The commission is mentioned neither in the United Nations’ Integrated Strategic Framework, completed in November 2010, nor in the UNDAF for 2012-2016, even though both documents express commitment to national reconciliation.

In summary, comparing operations in Burundi and CAR to East Timor, the following elements were also missing or inadequate:

- The Security Council mandates were inconsistent on conflict resolution and reconciliation;
- While the CBF country configurations had three year mandates, the practice of one year mandates for UN country operations remained;
- Comprehensive conflict analyses were missing;
- Instead of offering to provide the analysis needed, the UN was looking to the governments for information and peacebuilding priorities;
- While the UN did conduct some analyses, these were internal and of little value to the government responsible for the peacebuilding process;
- While strategic planning processes took place in Burundi and CAR, the appropriateness of the processes and plans require further analysis;
- The number of projects addressing conflict resolution and reconciliation was limited and national reconciliation programmes were missing in both countries.

3. Conclusion

The new UN peacebuilding architecture, working in conjunction with UN country operations, has brought progress in terms of planning support. Both Burundi and CAR acquired plans that offer some amount of peacebuilding direction and guidance. Peace operations not receiving such support might still look to East Timor as an illustration of the importance of proper strategic planning process and peacebuilding plans. As for the UN country operations’ mandates, one would hope to see a more consistent, clear-worded inclusion of reconciliation and conflict resolution. The PBC’s commitment to longer-term support represents progress but
can not fully abate the unfortunate one-year-at-a-time limitation of national UN peace operations.

How appropriate the new UN planning approaches are in general, will need to be thoroughly assessed, but one element stands out as needing improvement. Neither in CAR nor Burundi was the Priority Plan for Peacebuilding and the Framework for Peacebuilding informed by a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary conflict analysis. While appreciating a government’s right to direct the peacebuilding process in its own country, the UN should represent an element of neutrality, and offering a neutral, comprehensive conflict analysis as a basis for the planning process might be crucial. The findings from East Timor are an illustration, and one can only hope to avoid similar observations in other countries.

In terms of reconciliation and conflict resolution, the new UN architecture working in conjunction with governments, UN country operations and other actors, has expanded the amount of peacebuilding activities in Burundi and CAR, but contributions to reconciliation and conflict resolution seem limited.

The dialogue projects of Burundi and CAR represent laudable initiatives. Even if boycotted or sabotaged at later stages, these efforts may offer valuable lessons, and should be studied with this in mind. National large-scale reconciliation efforts, such as national truth and reconciliation commissions or entities for broad-scale reconciliation in the communities as suggested by CAVR in East Timor, remained elusive in all three countries, regardless of needs and governmental commitments. By September 2011, East Timor had yet to realize such efforts at a scale congruent with the needs, and Burundi and CAR had seen no such activities at all. (To the extent such activities disappear from the peacebuilding agenda, UN reports should explain why.)

The UN’s commitment to strengthening governments’ own capacity for such activities should be assessed. While observing that reconciliation, amnesty and justice can be difficult areas of cooperation, and that disagreements such as that seen in Burundi may be obstacles to implementation, it must be remembered that all other peacebuilding efforts are likely to be futile if hatred and unsettled scores remain. As governments often fail to deliver on large-scale reconciliation, should the UN enhance its capacity and offer governments to play a more active role in design and implementation, not only related to transitional justice and truth and reconciliation commissions, but also the kind of large-scale reconciliation efforts suggested by CAVR in East Timor? Given discussions within the Security Council on the UN’s role versus local leadership in reconciliation, this issue may be controversial122. It seems, however, that the High-level Panel’s ambition of more effective peacebuilding is unlikely to come to fruition unless reconciliation needs are addressed more effectively.

122 China’s view on this matter is one example, See Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh, “The Imperative to Rebuild: Assessing the Normative Case for Post conflict Reconstruction,” Ethics & International Affairs 23, no.2 (2009): 121-146.
List of Acronyms & Terminology

ASDT Timorese Social Democratic Association
BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BNUB United Nations Office in Burundi
BONUCA United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic
BINUCA United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
CAR Central African Republic
CAVR Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste
CEPAD Centre of studies for Peace and Development
CNRT National Council of Timorese Resistance
CPD-RDTL Popular Council for the Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste
DPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs
DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EU European Union
FALINTIL Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor Leste
F-FDTL Defence Forces of Timor Leste
FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor Leste
ICG International Crisis Group
ILO International Labour Organization
INTERFET International Force for East Timor
IOM International Organization for Migration
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
ONUB United Nations Office in Burundi
PNTL National Police force of Timor Leste
PBC Peacebuilding Commission
PBF The Peace-building Fund and
PBSO The Peacebuilding Support Office
SAM Strategic Assessment Mission
SUCO Village; local administrative unit from the Portuguese era
TAM Technical Assessment Mission
TL Timor Leste
TNI Indonesian Defence Forces
UDT Timorese Democratic Union
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor
UNOTIL United Nations Office in East Timor
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor