ATROCITY PREVENTION IN A MULTILATERAL SETTING

Integrating research and policy to maximise prevention and protection

Federica D'Alessandra

With Contributions from Ambassador Stephen Rapp

February 2022

SUSTAINING ATROCITY PREVENTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY[1]

Amidst a sharp re-allocation of governments' resources in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and taking into account what has been described by many as a 'crisis' of the multilateral order, the current moment has placed **new urgency** on an already-existing need to **increase cooperation** among those working with protection and prevention agendas, and to integrate the flow between research and policy to **maximise outputs, sustain impact, and advance strategic and operational objectives** in these areas. Although a number of important networks focusing on atrocity prevention already exist,[2] our research reveals a **distinct absence of cross-sectoral dialogue aimed at assisting policymakers** with targeted issues arising at the intersection between atrocity prevention and contiguous policy frameworks, evaluating lessons learned, and fostering action-oriented coordination both domestically and at the multilateral level.[3] To achieve these objectives, and taken into account the scarce resources, short decision-making timeframes, and competing policy priorities often faced by policymakers, we believe **a 'surge capacity'** is needed **in support of policymakers**. This means not only opening the right channels for the latest research and evidence to reach them at the right timing, and in a form that is digestible to them; but also encouraging and supporting **inter-agency exchange and coordination** at the domestic level, and a strategy of **coordination among 'like-minded' partners** at the multilateral level. None of the above can, however, be achieved without first integrating the flow of information and dialogue among the various actors, paying specific attention to the insight that atrocity prevention frameworks bring to the fore in this complex policymaking landscape.

1. The Need to Integrate Atrocity Prevention Insight into Policymaking Across the Board

At a governmental (and inter-governmental) level, **atrocity prevention as policy framework is often seen as separate from contiguous policy frameworks** that nevertheless share the agenda's protective and preventive goals.[4] Because of this, atrocity prevention is often confined to specific *loci* within governmental and inter-governmental structures, often marginalised – when not isolated – from other policy circles, and **detached from the needs and realities on the ground**. This has three major negative effects. First, eco-chambers can develop in this close-knit community, if cut out from

---

[1] We wish to acknowledge the contributions of **Rhiannon Neilsen** to this policy brief. This policy brief draws insight from a project by the University of Oxford titled: '*Connecting Atrocity Prevention Research and Policy*'. This brief updates, expands and further ideas already presented in Federica D'Alessandra, Shannon Raj Singh, Stephen J. Rapp, 'Atrocity Prevention in a Transatlantic Setting' *Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security*, June 2020 (at Annex I, starting page 29), available: https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/files/atrocitypreventioninatranstlanticsetting-finalpdf. Our project, including this brief, benefitted of the input and contributions of **Brianna Rosen**, recently Policy Engagement Manager, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security.

[2] Such as the Global Network for the Responsibility to Protect Focal Point, the Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes and the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect.

[3] This need was also recently acknowledged, inter alia, by the call for evidence issued by the UK Parliament with respect to its Parliamentary Inquiry on Promoting dialogue and preventing atrocities: the UK government approach: https://committees.parliament.uk/work/1661/promoting-dialogue-and-preventing-atrocities-the-uk-government-approach/, to which our research team submitted written evidence on this matter.

[4] Such as conflict prevention, civilian protection and counterterrorism, to name just a few.

inter-disciplinary insight. Secondly, this isolation of decision-makers often translates into a lack of 'up-to-date' information or understanding of ever-evolving dynamics on the ground, on which effective policymaking relies. Third, because it is often misunderstood in other policy circles, atrocity prevention is often seen as **working at cross-purposes** with other policy frameworks.[5] However, it is well-accepted that effective action requires holistic approaches that, by definition, cannot hinge on a single policy framework. In addition, **strong inter-sectional analysis is direly needed** to address and resolve any tensions that might arise at the intersection of these various frameworks. Addressing **interoperability**, and ensuring an **alignment between the strategic and operational objectives** of these various policy frameworks goes to the core of effective policymaking, and requires the **mainstreaming of an atrocity prevention lens into** the thinking, analysis and operationalization of **other policy frameworks,** including **cross-fertilisation and dialogue** among the relevant agencies, departments, and government structures.

Inter-departmental coordination is, of course, not a new need nor a novel solution. Most countries already have structures in place to facilitate such exchanges, including within White Hall. However, policymakers focusing on atrocity prevention are often cut out from such processes, either because atrocity prevention is rarely seen as a priority, or because the tensions perceived to exist around interoperability create **'zero sum game' dynamics that marginalise atrocity prevention policy**. In most cases, however, this is a **false dichotomy,** and to the contrary approaching policy options with an atrocity prevention lens will help identify alternative possibilities for action and, at a minimum, help shed light on potentially unforeseen, long-term consequences of actions taken in accordance with other policy frameworks.[6]

2. The Need to Further the Research Agenda

What is more, this isolation of atrocity prevention as a policy framework has led to similar dynamics within the atrocity prevention *research* community as well, resulting in a distinct **absence of cross-sectoral dialogue aimed at assisting policymakers** with issues arising at the intersection between atrocity prevention and contiguous policy frameworks, or with the strategic direction of the atrocity prevention field. Much akin to the formation of eco-chambers in policy circles, the self-containment of the atrocity prevention research community has indeed caused the research agenda to somewhat 'stale'.[7] Overcoming such impasse is essential to advance preventive and protective action. For

---

[5] The most illustrative example of this is the so-called 'peace v. justice' debate, encapsulating the dilemma often faced by those making policy decisions in situations of ongoing violence: should armed factions be 'incentivised' (through the promised of immunity from prosecution and amnesties) to get them to agree to end the violence? Or, is prosecuting perpetrators of mass violence imperative today, to foster confidence in the rule of law, and prevent that today's victims become tomorrow's perpetrators by embracing forms of 'vigilante justice'? To give another example, some of the operational decisions taken into counter-terrorism settings may be seen as conflicting with atrocity prevention objectives.
[6] For example, applying an atrocity prevention lens to development aid strategies can help identify risk factors specific to a certain context. This, in turn, can assist policymakers' decisions around the provision or withdrawal of specific forms of aid, or conditions attached therewith. This can be crucial in avoiding the allocation of resources that might be crucial to armed groups' mobilisation; or, at least, managing the risk that beneficiaries of development aid may weaponise such aid against civilians under their control, or use it in a manner that is inconsistent with protection and prevention agendas.
[7] Our lack of *systematic* understanding of the real efficacy of enforcement tools (such as targeted sanctions, among others) is a particularly cogent example of this. Another example, which is particularly relevant in light of changing growing geo-strategic equilibria and dynamics, is our lack of fresh insight into effective ways of raising the commission of atrocities as part of deliberate negotiation strategies concerning other policy domains (such as trade) in either bilateral or multilateral settings.

example, it has already been stated that, while sharing important goals with the atrocity prevention agenda, some contiguous policy framework – such as conflict prevention, civilian protection and countering violent extremism, just to name three – can present significant interoperability challenges and, at times, be seen as working at cross-purposes.[8] More sustained research efforts are thus needed to examine **points of synergy and convergence** across these frameworks, with a view to move past any such tensions. In addition, ongoing **changes in technology and geo-strategic dynamics**, among other factors, impose a compelling need to revise and re-orient the tactical application – and often strategic direction – of each of these policy frameworks. In addition, effective preventive action – and identification of risk – require **integration of the atrocity prevention agenda** into existing agencies and structures (at the national, regional and international level), but in a way that is closely aligned with the **needs and realities of communities on the ground**. In addition, whereas copious amounts of important scholarship already exist in many important areas, there is a need to significantly **strengthen interdisciplinary approaches** to scholarship, and to **make research findings most immediately accessible to policy makers**. In addition, we have identified the absence of a sustained platform for interaction between scholars and policymakers aimed to **address policymakers' specific and current needs** as a key area of need to strengthen preventive and protective action.

3. A Two-Part Initiative: Providing Actionable Research and Integrating Atrocity Prevention into Multilateral Policymaking

In furtherance of these objectives, and based on our research findings to date, we believe a **two-part solution is needed** to strengthen the integration of research and policy surrounding prevention and protection agendas. Specifically, we believe establishment of a platform bringing together stakeholders with a **successful history of mitigating atrocity crimes** and **promoting early and preventive policy *action*** in a more sustained, organised and interdisciplinary manner. The platform would consist of a Research Council and an Inter-Governmental Network, which will **operate symbiotically and in an iterative manner** to support a diverse policy constituency consisting of both governments and international organizations. The proposed platform will also create **mechanisms for structured engagement with key constituencies**, including legislators; military actors; existing domestic and international networks; advocacy groups; and the technology and humanitarian sectors. The **inclusion of local voices** and the perspectives of communities impacted by the violence will be an integral part of our approach to research.

Part 1

The **Research Council** would function similarly to the staff of the White House National Security Council, insofar as it would **respond to policymaker requests** – or, taskings – to **provide targeted**

---

[8] To provide a few examples of these tensions: whereas a conflict prevention approach to a crisis situation might often be conducive of measures such as immunity from prosecutions or amnesties in exchange for peace or ceasefire agreements, adding an atrocity prevention lens to the contextual policy analysis might reveal that – based on a range of risk indicators present in the country in question – immunity from prosecutions might actually fuel additional levels of violence, and directly contribute to precipitating further atrocities. Similarly, operational counter-terrorism needs might, at times, conflict with atrocity prevention or civilian protection imperatives. At the same time, all three policy frameworks converge normatively and strategically. Understanding how to minimise the tactical and operational tensions manifesting among these policy frameworks in a specific context – while furthering their normative and strategic alignment – advances the objectives under all three policy frameworks.

policy reports and briefings to the Network. In addition, the Council would also carry out independent research with a view to **incorporate lessons learned**, and advance the conceptualization and development of the field as a whole, thus contributing to **shaping the research agenda** for at least the next decade. At this stage, we envision a **tiered and concentric approach to membership** in the Council, comprising of:

(i)   *steering membership*, reserved for institutions and groups with considerable research capabilities and convening powers, who are willing to take on additional responsibilities, including taking turns in hosting a Secretariat;[9]

(ii)   *institutional membership* for leading institutions with demonstrated research capacity in the areas of focus of the Council, including the ability to challenge existing thinking around atrocity prevention and related policy frameworks, and help shape new conversations around normative commitments and implementation;[10]

(iii)   *individual membership* for individual experts, including thought leaders and former senior government officials not presently affiliated to a participating institution, but with significant insight to bear into one or more of the leading policy frameworks that are relevant to the Council's research agenda; and

(iv)   a *rising leaders'* cohort, aimed to inject new voices and thinking into the Council, including from affected regions, and to further inter-generational leadership and exchange.

To sustain and support the advancement of the research agenda, the Council would follow a **three-fold approach to research** consisting of:

(i)   A series of ***thematic* research strands**, focused on analysing areas of synergy and overcoming tensions among various protection and prevention policy frameworks;[11]

(ii)   A research strand focused on *micro- or **contextual-level analysis***, aimed to guide the application of sound policy options to concrete country or regional contexts, with a view to prioritise the **upstreaming of prevention strategies** in so-called *'amber'* contexts – that is,

---

[9] Currently, the following institutions are part of the steering group: the Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security of the Blavatnik School's Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (ELAC); the US Holocaust Memorial Museum Simon Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide; and McGill University's Center for International Peace and Security Studies. In addition, we are in conversation with a range of other potential candidates for Steering Committee membership, which include the European Council on Foreign Relations, and the United States Institute of Peace, among others.

[10] Institutional membership will be offered with some degree of flexibility, to accommodate different institutional realities and requirements. Examples of the type of institutions we envision for membership in the Council, specifically in the *transatlantic* region, are – pending their agreement: the Atlantic Council, the Stanley Center for Peace and Security, the Stimson Center, Chatham House, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the International Peace Institute (IPI), National Defense University (NDU), the Asia-Pacific Center on the Responsibility to Protect, the Danish Institute for International Studies, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Leeds, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies and the Stockholm International Research Peace Institute (SIPRI), among others. In addition, representatives of leading advocacy and philanthropic organisations such as Humanity United, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the DC-based Protection and Prevention Working Group, the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect and Protection Approaches, among others, would also be invited to attend convenings and provide input in our work.

[11] To keep the initial focus of our workload manageable, we propose focusing at the outset on the intersectionality of atrocity prevention with a handful of thematic strands. However, it is our hope that, as the platform grows and more partners join us, the scope of our thematic focus will grow to encompass other important areas, as discussed in Annex I.

countries or local contexts where atrocities have not yet peaked, but where a heightened risk exists unless timely and decisive action is taken. This strand of research would also help further our collective understanding of **lessons learned**; of the **targeted use of key atrocity prevention tools**, such as sanctions or international criminal justice measures; and of conditions to their effectiveness;[12] and

(iii) A research strand focused on *macro- and strategic-level analysis*, aimed to assist the development of **an overarching strategy** for advancing atrocity prevention goals and objectives **in light of ongoing technological developments and evolving geo-political priorities and dynamics**.[13]

Part 2

In addition to the Research Council, we propose supporting government leadership aimed at the convening of groupings of policy constituents – with overlapping strategic or contextual interests – that would interface with, and be supported by, the Council, to shape the platform's agenda in an *iterative* model, and help foster inter-governmental exchange and cooperation.[14] This **Inter-Governmental Network** should be **action-oriented**, bringing together policymakers from member States, as well as – where relevant – regional organizations, of **sufficient rank and experience** to be able to communicate freely with the key interlocutors. Meeting at least twice yearly, whilst also providing for the possibility of special meetings to deal with specific country situations or thematic issues, the Network – assisted by the Council – would conduct **focused examination**s into countries exhibiting atrocity early warning signs,[15] and **coordinate strategies for multilateral action**.[16] In addition, as mentioned above, the Network would be able to request studies to the Council.[17]

---

[12] Sanctions, for example, present an opportunity to break through stagnant discussions presenting a false dilemma between inaction or the use of force, particularly as it does not require the approval of the Security Council, which has inhibited effective prevention action in a number of contexts. Further, sanctions hold particular promise for economically powerful countries, such as those in the transatlantic region, and can also be effective in closing specific routes for the perpetration or financing of atrocities or other forms of violence. For example, the US government has authorised sanctions against those
who commit human rights abuses through information technology (the so-called "GHRAVITY sanctions"), which enable the sanctioning of both governments and corporations that play an enabling role in atrocity crimes.

[13] This research strand can be understood as evaluating three dimensions of atrocity prevention: (i) *internal*, i.e. examining how structures and processes within governments, organisations and local communities might be harnessed to develop a holistic approach to prevention; (ii) *systemic*, i.e. evaluating how domestic, regional and international structural elements (including the use of specific technologies) intersect around and can be leveraged in support of preventive objectives; and (iii) *geo-strategic*, i.e. examining how these structures and processes might be oriented and adapted in light of geo-political trends and developments.

[14] Recalling that the United States in April 2012 established an Atrocity Prevention Board within its national security apparatus, and thereafter launched what became a semi-annual consultation process with six other States, there exists a foundation for a multi-State network to develop, deliver and coordinate effective action to prevent atrocities. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness, it is our recommendation that this network should include the United States government.

[15] Based on reporting from reliable sources on the ground, monitoring of open-source communications, and expert analysis provided by the Council.

[16] This includes: receiving reporting on the impact of economic actors on the commission of atrocities; reviewing developments on accountability for mass atrocities; and emphasising 'upstream' program interventions intended to assist countries in becoming more resilient and resistant to the forces that would unleash the violence.

[17] These could include studies to determine political, social and cultural factors that may contribute to or inhibit the commission of atrocities in specific countries; or asking social media companies to study the spread through their services of messages of ethnic or religious hatred and incitement to violence, and to work with the Council on the development of mission-apt systems to restrict, moderate or remove such messaging while preserving it for accountability purposes.

In the initial phase of our work, we suggest maintaining a focus on the region served by the Council's steering members.[18] However, as our platform grows, we propose that membership in the Network be open to representatives of countries that meet the following cumulative **eligibility criteria**:[19]

(i)   A **foreign and security policy** that is implemented through a diplomatic service, and by funding instruments that **focus on goals such as the protection of human rights and the rule of law, peace and stability**;

(ii)   In addition, having **consistently deployed assets** for programs or activities intended to provide benefits to threatened populations living well **outside these States' borders**;[20]

(iii)   Finally, having **democratic and publicly accountable governments** that **support universal values and international norms**.[21]

4.   The Nexus Bringing our Vision Together

Linking the Council and the Network would be a **Secretariat**,[22] which would play a central role in receiving and directing inquiries for research; in coordinating and liaising among members of the Council, and between Council members and external partners, such as policymakers and affected communities on the ground; in assisting with various operational aspects, such as convening technical and regional working groups; and in maintaining rosters of experts, among others. Finally, the Secretariat would leverage the convening power of its host institution to hold annual meetings with various stakeholders, including on the margins of events such as the Munich Security Conference, and

---

[18] The choice to maintain an initial regional focus is not only dictated by the need to maintain our workload manageable. Large membership networks are, in fact, not always popular with senior government officials whose own country priorities might not be addressed by larger groupings of states. Partly for this reason, we have witnessed the emergence of smaller regional groupings that discuss issues of greater relevance to their respective governments/regions, e.g., the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, and the European Network of R2P Focal Points.

[19] To maintain our workload manageable in the initial phase of our work, we will focus on supporting efforts within our region. As a first step, we will support government leadership in the convening of a **'strengthened Coffee Group' to also include the European Union** and, based on the focus of each meeting's discussion, **other governments and international organizations from the regions or countries of interest**. Whereas we will support and seek to engage with other existing networks, our objective is to foster **action-oriented leadership and coordination**. For this reason, we propose a focus akin to a **micro-multilateral network**, as these are often more successful than larger structured settings in providing a space for policymakers to explore ideas and approaches, particularly in view of shared regional values and challenges.

[20] Such as for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, stabilisation and reconstruction, countering violent extremism and strengthening the rule of law. The Network should cooperate closely with and enlist the support of non-contributing States, but should itself consist *only* of those States that are **prepared to provide the *assets* without which initiatives will not be realised** even when there are many vocal supporters and willing implementing partners. In addition to states, based on this criterion, the network would also include the European Union.

[21] Of course, it is recognised that governments are obligated to give the highest priority to protecting their own citizens, and when they act abroad will need to justify these actions as serving this priority. Thus, political realities may make it impossible for leaders to act to support universal values in *all* of their foreign relations. But the State members of the Network will have **publicly articulated policies that allow for external action to respond to distant violations of international norms, particularly when these violations result in death, deprivation and suffering at a scale that diminishes all of humankind**.

[22] We continue to assess the advantages and potential drawbacks of alternative models for our platform, such as a looser consortium of actors or institutions. However, at this stage, we believe that some form of structure at the centre of our platform is crucial for the platform's launch and initial coordination, its interface with policymakers, and – thus – its long-term viability.

support the Council's research and the strategic direction of the platform. Chart 1 below provides a visual illustration of how the proposed structure would work.

Chart 1[23]

5.   From Vision to Implementation

As already mentioned elsewhere in this paper, in order to keep our workflow manageable, and 'trial-run' our two-part solution, we would **prioritise servicing policymakers in our region in the early stages of our platform's operation**. In particular, within our region, we submit that the following could constitute priority policy constituencies for engagement:

- Members of the International Atrocity Prevention Working Group (IAPWG), previously known as the 'Coffee Group';[24]
- Regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); and

---

[23] Credit for this helpful graph go to Rhiannon Neilsen.

[24] This includes representatives of seven governments – the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Netherlands, and Denmark – that convened during high-level UN General Assembly sessions in New York starting in September 2012, and began in 2014 to meet a second time each year in one of the member's capitals. Originally convened by the US government during the Obama Administration, the IAPWG appears today to be the *only* micro-multilateral network in the transatlantic region bringing policymakers together to discuss atrocity prevention strategies and approaches. As such, the Group represents a great starting point to engage with a series of like-minded governments already taking an active lead in atrocity prevention. Further, despite the capabilities of the Group's affiliated governments, its own capacity remains limited, as members often face internal and bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining needed resources, which would benefit the support of the proposed Research Council.

- International organization with global reach, primarily the United Nations and the World Bank.

Interactions with such regional targets of influence would be integrated, as needed, with interactions with additional countries and organizations with interests and competences in the contexts at hand. For example, with regards to European engagement, interface with countries such as Norway, Sweden, France, Ireland and Italy – which are not members of the IAPWG, but nevertheless lead on important agendas such as Women, Peace and Security, Crimes Against Children in Conflict, international criminal justice and accountability, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping and stability operations – would also be prioritised as part of our approach, in addition to engagement with other relevant regional actors such as the Council of Europe (CoE), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or the Organization of American States (OAS), among others.

In addition, as mentioned above, we would endeavour to prioritise the creation of **mechanisms for structured engagement with key constituencies**, including legislators, military actors, existing domestic and international network, advocacy groups and the technology and humanitarian sectors. As mentioned, in fact, the **inclusion of local voices** and the perspectives of communities impacted by the violence will be an integral part of our approach to research.

6. Conclusions

Based on research to date, we believe that the time is ripe to engineer better integration of the flows between research and policy, and among multiple streams in the policy landscape that currently lack input and analysis from atrocity prevention. This would enable maximum preventive and protective impact. What we proposed is a two-part solution, constituting of research and analysis to inform policy for prevention and protection (Part 1), and an integration and implementation of prevention and protection in multilateral policymaking and action (Part 2). At the University of Oxford, we believe we are **uniquely placed** to help address some of these research needs, alongside partners with similar research capacity and convening power. With the support and cooperation of policymakers, we stand ready to put our capabilities and expertise to servicing the **provision of 'surge capacity'** as necessary, to help foster cross-sectoral and cross-border policy exchanges, and to help address complex policy dilemmas through the provision of sound academic research and evidence.

ANNEX I. Recommended *Thematic* Strands for the Council's Research Agenda

Through consultations and independent research, we have identified the following key areas for thematic study as part of the Research Council's initial research agenda:

(i) New Technologies

The Council will include a research strand that examines the intersection of new technologies and atrocity crimes. Specifically, it will investigate two main areas of focus: first, how technology might be leveraged by regimes and violent non-state actors to *perpetrate* atrocity crimes, and second, how technology might be harnessed to *prevent* atrocity crimes. The Council will conduct research on these technologies as part of broader efforts to identify new avenues for atrocity prevention in the digital age.

(ii) Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, Peace and Stability Operations, and Civilian Protection

A thematic study of the linkages between atrocity prevention and contemporary peace and stability operations, or other protection and preventive policy frameworks aimed to protect and empower vulnerable populations (such as women and children) and support capacity building, will also be a priority for the Council. This includes not only integration of atrocity prevention with the Protection of Civilians (PoC) framework – often associated with UN, EU, and NATO operations – but also with modern, multidimensional peace operations aimed both more broadly at addressing the roots of conflict and at political solutions to dynamics of tension within states, as well as with operations and approaches to resilience guided by policy frameworks such as Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (utilised by the World Bank), among others.

(iii) Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Counterterrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) are two interconnected policy priorities that present important areas of overlap with atrocity prevention issues. While CT efforts tend to focus on the tactical disruption of terrorist networks, the PCVE agenda aims to develop a strategic framework for eliminating the underlying drivers of violent extremism in the long term. The Research Council would be well placed to provide policymakers with recommendations for aligning atrocity prevention frameworks with CT and PCVE, ensuring that they do not work at cross-purposes.

While ultimately narrowing our recommendations to the above key areas for the Council's initial research agenda, the following **additional frameworks (and how they intersect with atrocity prevention approaches)** are candidates to be examined as soon as the Research Council structure begins to expand: Sustainable Development, Women, Peace and Security, Conflict Prevention, Stability Operations, Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Religious Freedom, Minority Rights and Protection of Cultural Heritage, and Armed Conflict.[25]

---

[25] A more thorough discussion of the fuller list of potentially relevant policy frameworks, which arose from a scoping exercise we conducted between January and June 2020, can be consulted in: Federica D'Alessandra, Shannon Raj Singh, Stephen J. Rapp, *Atrocity Prevention in a Transatlantic Setting*, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, June 2020 (at Annex II, starting page 35), available: https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/files/atrocitypreventioninatranstlanticsetting-finalpdf.

Oxford Programme on
International Peace and Security